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ABSTRACT

VISION

The National Space Transportation
Policy "establishes national policy,
guidelines,
and
Implementing
actions for the conduct of National
space transportation programs that
will sustain and revitalize U.S. space
transportation capabilities .••". The
direction
to
the
National
Aeronautics
and
Space
Administration
(NASA)
is
to
"provide for the improvement of
the Space Shuttle system focusing
on rellablllty, safety, and cost
effectiveness." as well as "be the
lead
agency
for
technology
development and demonstration
for next generation reusable space
transportation systems, such as
the single-stage-to-orbit concept."

Reliable and affordable access to space
is the stated goal of future space
From an
transportation vehicles.
operational perspective, we believe that
this goal can be achieved qnly when
system operational functloris drive
vehicle design. Research should be
focused on those areas which minimize
the number of subsystems & fluids used,
the total parts count, and the amount of
testing required to valic;late system
·
integrity.
'In the development of the Reusable
Launch
Vehicle
(RLV)
a
joint
Government/Industry
Operations
Synergy Team (OST) was commissioned
to ensure that lessons learned from
prevlOus space transportation programs
were applied to RLV. The OST has
developed a vision concept which Is
directly applicable to RLV and any next
generation space transportation vehicle.
This vision concept is based on the
findings of the Access To Space
Advanced Technology Team (Option 3)1
and the vast experience base from
The Advanced
previous programs.
Technology Team findings are contained
in four basic requirements:

With this vision, NASA has Initiated
Cooperative Agreement
Notices
between NASA and the private
sector for X-33 (Reusable Launch
Vehicle-Advanced
Technology
Demonstrator) and X-34 (Reusable
Launch
Vehicle-Small
Reusable
Booster) which would provide
Insight to a decision by December
1996 to proceed with sub-scale
flight demonstration to prove the
single-stage-to-orbit
(SSTO)
concept.
This paper deals with
operational Issues which must be
dealt with In order to achieve SSTO
goals of reliable low cost space
transportation
and
order
of
magnitude reductions in operating
costs.

Define the mission narrowly to
transportation only.
Apply modem advanced technology
to design a simple vehicle with less
complex subsystems and fewer
elements.
Avoid
flight-to-flight
certification
through a prototype development and
flight test program.
Adopt a management philosophy that
empowers individuals to make
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Reduce operations and hardware
complexity for maximum utilization of
resources and reduce opportunity for
human-induced system failures: Less
Mhands-on", less human factor.
Employ near ~ ground
management planning at top levels.
Focus on automatic Interactive
schedullng of flight vehicle, ground
support facilities,
and
support
logistics.
minimum
standardized
Adapt
payload Interfaces
to assure
maxirum flexibility and affordability.
The most affordable vehicle will be
blind to payload needs; like a truck,
not a hospital life support system.
Eimilate payload Impact on the
launch vehicle system infrastructure.
Ensure joint participation Nil
application of the synergism available
between
Operations,
Avionics,
Propulsion, Payloads, and Vehicle
Design
to
the
preliminary
archltecturelvehicle concept, and
operations development process {i.e.
Integrated Product Tea'Tl - IPT). This
entails
Identification
of
technologlH that can enable
development of a vehicle system
meeting attributes of the National
Space Transportation Polley'.
The role of engineering (concept,
development. and technology) during
the operatlonal era will be to
perfonn continuous Improvement
and technology advancement for
future market driven needs
(retain X-33 capability).

decisions at the lowest possible level
replacing today's committee and
duplicative review process.
Building on this, the OST developed an
RLV Operations Concept "Vlsion" which
comprised ten goals focused on
operational improvements which are
geared towards mlnlmlzJng ground test
time and resource dependence while
maximlzJng
vehfde
self-diagnosis,
dependability and mirVnl.m servicing
requirements2 :

Provide a simplified, ~
automated
vehicle
enabling
mi nimum periodic and repetitive
maintenance
(aircraft-like)
and
resultant short turnaround time
between
missions (hours,
not
months).
Strive to isolate vehide ground
processing from dependence on
facilities and GSE.
Routine,
should
scheduled
turnaround
replenish consumables only_
Promote
vehlcle
health
monitoring/management systems
and self-test at a level which supplies
only operations and maintenance
(O&M) anomaly related Information
that requires corrective action prior to
next flight. Let the vehicle •talk" to the
ground remotely for processing and
Incorporate
maintenance needs.
vehicle
engineering
special
instrumentation only on specifically
assigned technology demonstration
vehides (i.e. X-33).
Elmnate
"flight
readiness-style•
The goal of driving
the total
vehicle certification for every flight.
transportation system design rather than
Provide alrcraftMstyle vehlcle-type
reacting to the vehide design shoukt
certificate for repetitive oommerdal
result In the realization of overaH
flight operations.
economic goals associated with future
Design-In performance margins
space transportation systems. We are
and flight hardware allowances to
losing today's market as international
eliminate proceHlng Impact, i.e.,
competition continues to drtve reduced
strive to elimlnats unplanned work.
cost of annual mass to orbit. Vehide
Mission design and flight operations
sizing should be optimized around
are ~ autonomous by
identified POTENTIAL. pa)ioad user
design.
No dedicated software
requirements
and not focused on a
maintenance function is required to
single user's needs. In order to promote
support operations.
Canaveral Counclf or Technlcal Societies - Thirty-Second Space Congress
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domestic launch opportunities (market
growth) we must rethink our current
mind set and approaches to vehicle
certification
which
are
currently
measured in months rather than hours.
During the course of the Commercial
Space Transport Study (CSTS) the
industry alliance recognized that aEarty
identification and definition of system
attributes and requirements is essential
to ensuring the transportation system
meets the user's needs."".
Table 1,
Common CSTS Attributes, is an
overview of identified attributes which
must be found in the next generation
launch system as identified in CSTS Final
Report in order for the system to be both
operationally & economically feasible.
Table 1 - Common CSTS Attributes
Catenorv
Dependability

Schedule
Reliability
Cost
Operations

Capabilities

Availability

Responsiveness

Attribute
High probability of
Launching on
Schedule
Minimum Advanced
Bookino Time
>Current Systems
Minimum Cost Per
Launch
Standardized and
Simplified Payload
Interfaces
Support Multiple
Payload Classes
Provide Deliv"ery
to Multiple
Destinations
Provide On-Ortll
Rendezvous and
Docking
Capabilities
Provide Delivery
and Return
Ca nab ii Wes
High Probability
System Will Be In An
Operational Rather
Than a Standdown
State
Minimum Respoll5e
Time for Launching On
Noed

SHUTTLE EVOLUTION
During the Apollo Lunar Exploration
Program it became apparent that the next
step was a trip to Mars. ln order to go to
Mars, man needed to gain a thorough
understanding of living in space for
longer duration's than a moon flight. A
manned space station in earth orbit
seemed to be the answer; however, the
cost of access to space in support of a
space station was not supported by
NASA's projected annual budget. The
solution was an inlefim space station,
Skylab, and the development of a
reusable space transportation system,
the Space Shuttle.
··
·
The economic plan used to develop the
operations scenario for the shuttle was
a five orbiter fleet with a projected flight
rate of forty flights per year from the
John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
and an additional twenty flights per year
from Vandenberg Air Force Base
(VAFB). Early analyses confinned that
forty flights from KSC could only be
achieved if vehicle ground turnaround
could be completed within 160 hours,
hence the 160 hour turnaround
allocation. The 160 hour allocation
processing timeline included
initial
operations and sating, orbiter test
operations, post flight trouble-shooting,
Space
Shuttle
Main
Engine/Main
Propulsion
System
(SSMEJMPS)
operations, cargo operations, Thermal
Protection System (TPS) maintenance &
repair, maintenance & servicing, element
integration,
fluid
servicing
and
countdown.
Allocations were also
developed for facility maintenance and
turnaround.
These timelines were
accepted and used as PrOgram
requirements/goals and assessments of
the allocated timelines were perfonned.
The
process
used
to
focus
improvements at the launch site and to
provide visibility to the shuttle program
manager was the Shuttle Turnaround
and Analysis Report (STAR). This report
was updated on a quarterly basis by the
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long-tenn operationa; benefits, most
recommendations for a more supportive
design were not adopted . Therefore,
not
supporting the design was
compatible with allocated timelin~. or
reaching the mission cost goal of $15
million/flight.

Shuttle Turnaround and Analysis Group
(STAG).

The goal of operational efficiency was
visualized in concept development of the
shuttle and the STAR. This is illustrated
in Figure 1, Artist Concept - Shuttle
Mating With Payload.

In order for a space transportation
architecture to be affordable, vehicle
design architecture must be driven by
operations functions so that operations
requirements are well understood before
the concept is frozen. This will allow a
complete understanding of operational
requirements/economics
which
are
required to provide program affordability.
In the case of the shuttle, the operations
concept was frozen before operational
were
requirements/economics
understood and compromises to the
concept were pennitted well into the
production phase in order to 1) try to
reach system performance goals, 2)
reduce vehicle weight, and 3) reduce
development cost through utilization of
old technologies from previous programs
to minimize development risk in schedule
and hardware.
Each of these
compromises resulted in changes to
flight and ground hardware as well as
the shuttle operations concept. In order
for RLV to achieve its stated goals,
similar compromises must be eliminated.
If in the case of RLV, operational
compromises are allowed, one might
expect that the outcome would be similar
to that illustrated in Figure 2, Shuttle
Orbiter Columbia In Workstand.

Figure 1 Artist Concept - Shuttle Mating
With Payload
This concept, dated April 8 '74, stressed
the use of mobile platfonns to gain
access to the crew compartment and
payload bay areas for reconfiguration of
the vehicle.
Additionally, the original
shuttle concepts recognized the benefits
of reduced recurring costs. This can be
seen in the limited number of personnel
supporting ground turnaround operations
in the orbiter processing facility (OPF).
The space
shuttle
transportation
economics was detennined using an
operations scenario that was based on
previously mentioned allocation timelines.
Assessments of the design highlighted
incompatibilities with the allocation
which
required
system
timelines
modifications.
However, because 1)
non-recurring
cost,
2)
Design,
Development, Test, and Evaluation
(DDT&E) schedule,
and 3) weight
pei"lalties were a higher priority than

Since 1979 five vehicles have been
processed through launch facilities at
KSC. In that time the average turnaround
time for vehicle processing through the
OPF has been approximately sixty days
(3 shifts/day), five days through the
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (3
shifts/day), and twenty-two days at the
launch pad (3 shifts/day). Due to the
complexity
of
the
vehicle
and
connections
to
ground
support
equipment, multiple vehicle service
umbilicals are required. Connection and
verification between the vehicle and the
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the design ap·proach drove a large
ground infrastructure resulting in high
recurring costs and lengthly processing
times measured in months rather than
hours.
In other words, this vehicle is highly
dependent on ground connections and
support services to perfonn ground
procedures. The vast majority of these
test procedures are required servicing,
irrespective of scheduled maintenance
or in-flight fallures. As stated earlier,
future space transportation systems
should strive to isolate vehicle ground
processing from
dependence
on
facilities and GSE. By adopting th1s, the
cost of recurring operations will be
significantly reduced thereby achieving
the stated goal of reliable and affordable
access to space.

Figure 2 - Shuttle Orbiter Columbia In
Workstand

EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTS

corresponding facility to insure safety of
personnel, facilities, and equipmenl
Eadl of these vehicle service umbilicals
provide some combination of fluids,
gases, ground power, and data to the
vehicle enabling ground test capabilities,
safing, operations and servicing.

Since 1984 the government has
investigated numerous concepts for the
development of a replacement to the
Each of these concepts
shuttle.
focused on the vehicle only and did not
address the entire flight and ground
systems. Major emphasis was placed
on the reduction of flight element
production costs and retained the
support the design approach, starting
with the rocket engines, then the vehicle,
and then the ground facilities and
It was
support equipment required.
recognized that operations experience
was needed to evolve to a more
operable approach for the future.
However, due to priorities at the launch
operations center, personnel with
hands-on experience were not actively
involved in these advanced study
efforts. In many cases the concept was
targeted to replace shuttle; however,
there was no definitive plan to bridge the
gap from shuttle until the new program
was
certified
as
operational.
Additionally, the lack of definition of a
mission mcx:lel in many cases led to the
premature termination of each effort.

vehicle
service
umbilical
These
connections are connected immediatety
after landing at either Edwards Air Force
Base (EAFB) or KSC. A set of dedicated
vehicle service umbilicals are connected
at each ground station as the elements
are processed through the respective
facilities (i.e. Shuttle Landing Facility,
Orbiter Processing Facility, Vehicle
Assembly Building, Launch Pad, etc.).
Eadl time an element is moved between
ground stations, the vehicle service
umbilical must be disconnected from one
facility and reconnected at the next. n
addition, system integrity must be
verified at each facility before any
processing operations can take place.
1he vehicle is dependent on these
vehicle service umbilicals until T-31
seconds at which time the vehicle is
operating on internal power controlled
by on-board computers. This support
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The following is a brief overview of
some of these concepts:
The
Space
Transportation
Architecture
Study
(STAS)
recognized the need for an affordable
space transportation system capable
of adlieving lower life-cycle costs
with
simplified and
streamlined
operations. STAS focused it's efforts
in five areas: (1) logistics support
systems (ground & space), (2)
spacecraft modularization, (3) launch
vehicle & orbit transfer systems, (4)
technology
assessment
&
development programs, and (5)
mission control systems. Eadl of
these areas drove architecture
synthesis and systems development
INhile STAS attempted to drive system
design, the evolutionary architecture
approach encompassed as many as
four different architectures over a
fifteen year period while each one
addressed upwards of four vehides.
The operations concept for each of
these candidate architectures was
complex and neither user friendly nor
operationally efficient.
The Advanced Launch System
(ALS) architecture allocated a goal
for cost to orbit. Unike STAS which
was a combination of reusable CWld
expendable vehicles, the
ALS
architecture was
comprised of
expendable vehicles. ALS stressed
high reliability, robustness, flexibility
and cost.
The ALS technology
demonstration program was focused
on reducing system complexity white
significantly reducing program cost.
With ALS being a DoD effort CWld
Shuttle-C being a NASA effort
congesstonal support was limited.
One program was ac.ceptable but the
development of both was unrealistic.
In the case of ALS, the emphasis on
the reduction of flight e'8ment
production costs did not necessarily
equate to.reduced operations costs.
Shuttle-C was envisioned to fiU the
gap between shutUe and ALS5 . Using
an unmanned cargo carrier in place of
the orbiter, Shuttle-C was compatible

with existing shutUe infrastructure
and offered a heavy-lift capability (up
to 150K lbs. to low earth orbit) within
a four year window. In the spring of
1989 a Shuttle-C Users Conference
was
sponsored
at
Huntsville,
Alabama to enlighten the user
community of system capabilities and
detennine a preliminary mission model.
The then Space Station Freedom was
targeted at that time as a potential
user in the space station assembly
sequence and the logistics resupply
missions.
Due to sharing the
development costs, the space station
community was not ready to c:ommil
to using the Shuttle-C. The message
from other potential users was ·build
it and we will come·; however, no
one was willing to step up and commi
to Shuttle-C. With no clear definition
of annual utilization the program was
ultimately terminated.
The National Launch System
(NLS) consisted of three vehicle
configurations (1 )
a two stage
heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV)
capable of delivering 135K lbs. to low
earth orbit -- NLS1 , (2) a 1.5 stage
vehicle capable of delivering 50 K lbs.
to low earth orbit -- NLS2, and (3) a
single stage vehicle capable of
delivering 20K lbs. to low earth orbit -NLS3. NLS1 and NLS2 utilized a
common core and a corrmon
propulsion module. NLS2 and NLS3
utilized a common upper stage. NL.S
was a design to cost approach based
on allocated cost targets. NLS cost
models
used
cost
estimating
relationships (CER's) which had been
in use for years. The lesson learned
in NLS was, in order for true cost
savings to be realized, these CER's
must be evaluated against adlieved
actuals (i.e. Shuttle, Delta, etc.) so
that the differences can be both
understood and accounted for. If not,
the goal of low recurring costs will be
projected, but are not likely to be
achieved. Throughout NLS concept
development
a
new
Space
Transportation Main Engine (SlME)
was under development.
SThE
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concept developers recognized the
need for product development teams
and
STME
development
was
structured around this approach .
Interaction between each of the AJT's
helped to maintain focus of system
capability design goals. Again the
lack of a market and utilization goals
was a limiting factor in concept
development
Access to Space was • ... a study
responding to a Congressional
request in the NASA FY1993
Appropriations Act. "5 . "The goals of
the study were to identify the best
vehides
and
transportation
architectures
to
make
major ·
reductions in the cost of space
transportation (at least 50 per cent),
while at the same time increasing
safety for flight crews for the existing
shuttle option by at least an order
magnitude.
In addition, vehicle
reliability was to exceed 0.98 percent,
and, as important, the robustness,
pad time, turnaround time, and other
aspects of operability were to be
vastly improved. The study examined
three major optional architectures: (1)
retain and upgrade the Space Shuttle
and expendable launch vehicles, (2)
develop
new
vehicles
using
conventional
technologies
and
transition
from current vehides
beginning in 2005, and (3) develop
new
reusable
vehicles
using
advanced technologies, and transition
from current vehicles beginning in
2008 ...e. Like shuttle, the advanced
technology option operations scenario
was built on allocated timelines and
an assumed set of launch site
facilities (using existing facilities to the
greatest extent possible).
The
approach again was to support the
vehicle design and not design for
support. In the case of affordable
access to space, the question is, will
a fifty percent reduction in recurring
costs
provide
a
competitive
transportation system.
Even more
important, will the access to space
concepts stimulate market growth in
domestic launch opportunities.

The Reusable Launch Vehicle
(RLV)IX-33 is.an outgrowth of Option
3 from the Access to Space Studies.
In the observations and conclusions
section of the report NASA states • .. .
an architecture featuring a new
advanced technology single-stage-toorbit pure-rocket launch vehicle was
recommended as the most attractive
option. It has the greatest potential
for reducing annual operations costs
as well as life-cycle costs, it would
develop important new technologies
with dual-use in industry (such as
composite vehicle structures for cars
and airplanes), it would place the U.S
in an
extremely advantageous
position with respect to international
competition, and would leapfrog the
U.S. into a next-generation launch
capability: 5 .
The Cooperative
Agreement
Notices
previously
mentioned are the . government's
attempt to bring industry into a proactive role in the development of
requirements and the direction this
concept will take.
Additionally,
industry is being tapped to share in
the cost of the X-33/RLV to insure
that vehicle designs indeed meet
established goals of reliability and
affordable access to space in an
international market place.

THENEXTSTEP
In response to the President's Space
Transportation Policy, NASA and other
designated government agencies have
responded by initiating three efforts:
In response to the challenge of singlestage-to-orbit development, NASA
has
issued
NASA
Research
Announcements
(NRA's)
and
C.ooperative
Agreement
Notices
(CAN's) with industry leading to the
development of a sub-scale SSTO
prototype known as X-33, ultimatety
leading to industry's development and
operation of a full-scale Rl V.
h!ASA's Space Shuttle Program has
advocated the use of the shuttle as a

Canaveral Council of Technical Societies - Thift.y-Second Spece Con{T8ss

1·27

flying
test-bed
for
common
technology demonstrations with the
RLV.
The Department of Defense (DoD)
has initiated an evolutionary upgrade
path for it's current fleet of
expendable laund'l vehides (EL V).
The ELV modernization program will
play a helpful role in gaining
experience in certain ted'lnologies
regarding flight experience required
prior to RLV operations .

candidate design concepts and asking
the following questions:
What has changed in this design
concept that realistically supports
CERprojections ?
What reductions/functions have been
minimized/eliminatedas a result of this
analysis in comparison to previous
transportation systems which support
infrastructure simplification?
Based on the above, will the vehicle
meet stated design and cost
comprom1smg
objectives without
either operability, maintainability, or
supportability goals during system
operation ?

CONCLUSIONS
In dosing we feel it is appropriate to
restate the experiences from previous
laund'l programs which led to the
development of goals in the OST RLV
Operations Concept Vision:

Some efforts for the RLV have started
off using the same approach as shuttle,
but the pre-eminent lesson learned from
shuttle is to design for support and not
simply support the design. If you do
what you did before , you will get what
you got before.

Reduce system integrity verification
impacts through automation.
Simplify
and
reduce
support
equipment demands and functions.
Strive
for
one
time
vehide
certification.
Eliminate payload impad to launch
vehide system infrastructure and
operations.
PT's
to
design
Empower
architectureJvehide concept with a
focus on reliability and affordability.
Optimize annual/mass to orbit and
single vehide utilization and not
cost/lb. to orbit in one launch.
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As advanced vehide concepts are
developed, concept analysis should be
realistically evaluated by reviewing
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